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Abstract
Computational problem certificates are additional data structures for
each output, which can be used by a—possibly randomized—verification
algorithm that proves the correctness of each output. In this paper, we
give an algorithm that computes a certificate for the minimal polynomial
of sparse or structured n×n matrices over an abstract field, of sufficiently
large cardinality, whose Monte Carlo verification complexity requires a
single matrix-vector multiplication and a linear number of extra field oper-
ations. We also propose a novel preconditioner that ensures irreducibility
of the characteristic polynomial of the generically preconditioned matrix.
This preconditioner takes linear time to be applied and uses only two ran-
dom entries. We then combine these two techniques to give algorithms
that compute certificates for the determinant, and thus for the character-
istic polynomial, whose Monte Carlo verification complexity is therefore
also linear.
1 Introduction
We consider a square sparse or structured matrix A ∈ Fn×n, where F is an exact
field. By sparse or structured we mean that multiplying a vector by A requires
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fewer operations than a dense matrix-vector multiplication. The arithmetic
cost to apply A is denoted by µ(A) which thus satisfies µ(A) ≤ n(2n − 1) (n2
multiplications and n(n− 1) additions).
For such sparse matrices, Wiedemann’s algorithm, together with some pre-
conditioning [3], provides means to compute the rank, the minimal polynomial
or the characteristic polynomial of sparse matrices, via the computation of the
minimal polynomial of its associated sequence projected at random values [29].
The novelty of this paper is to provide an algorithm that computes a certifi-
cate for the minimal polynomial of sparse matrices. The Monte Carlo verifica-
tion complexity of our certificate is linear in the input size and this certificate
is composed of the minimal polynomial itself, of three other polynomials and of
a vector.
The verification procedure used throughout this paper is that of interactive
certificates with the taxonomy of [9]. Indeed, we consider a Prover, nicknamed
Peggy, who will perform a computation and provide additional data structures.
We also consider a Verifier, nicknamed Victor, who will check the validity of
the result, faster than by just recomputing it. By certificates for a problem
that is given by input/output specifications, we mean, as in [19, 20], an input-
dependent data structure and an algorithm that computes from that input and
its certificate the specified output, and that has lower computational complexity
than any known algorithm that does the same when only receiving the input.
Correctness of the data structure is not assumed but validated by the algorithm.
By interactive certificate, we mean interactive proofs, similar to
∑
-protocols (as
in [6]) were the Prover submits a Commitment, that is some result of a com-
putation; the Verifier answers by a Challenge, usually some uniformly sampled
random values; the Prover then answers with a Response, that the Verifier can
use to convince himself of the validity of the commitment. Several rounds of
challenge/response might be necessary for Victor to be fully convinced. Such
proof systems are said to be complete if the probability that a true statement is
rejected by the Verifier can be made arbitrarily small; and sound if the proba-
bility that a false statement is accepted by the Verifier can be made arbitrarily
small. In practice it is sufficient that those probability are < 1, as the protocols
can always be run several times. Some of our certificates will also be perfectly
complete, that is a true statement is never rejected by the Verifier.
All our certificates can be simulated non-interactively by Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [11]: uniformly sampled random values produced by Victor are replaced by
hashes of the input and of previous messages in the protocol. Complexities
are preserved, as producing cryptographically strong pseudo-random bits by a
cryptographic hash function (e.g., like the extendable output functions of the
SHA-3 family defined in [2, 23]), is linear in the size of both its input and out-
put. More precisely, we will need O(n log(n)) cryptographically strong random
bits for the minimal polynomial certificate of Figure 3, and only O(log(n)) for
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the determinant, Figures 4 and 5.
There may be two main ways to design such certificates. On the one hand,
efficient protocols can be designed for delegating computational tasks. In recent
years, generic protocols have been designed for circuits with polylogarithmic
depth [15, 26]. The resulting protocols are interactive and their cost for the
Verifier is usually only roughly proportional to the input size. They however
can produce a non negligible overhead for the Prover and are restricted to certain
classes of circuits. Variants with an amortized cost for the Verifier can also be
designed, see for instance [24], quite often using relatively costly homomorphic
routines. We here however want the Verifier to run faster than the Prover, so
we discard amortized models where the Verifier is allowed to do a large amount
of precomputations, that can be amortized only if, say, the same matrix is
repeatedly used [4, 14].
On the other hand, dedicated certificates (data structures and algorithms
that are publicly verifiable a posteriori, without interaction) have also been
developed, e.g., for dense exact linear algebra [13, 20, 12]. There the certificate
constitutes a proof of correctness of a result, not of a computation, and can
thus also stand an independent, computation error-correcting verification. The
obtained certificates are problem-specific, but try to reduce as much as possible
the overhead for the Prover, while preserving a fast verification procedure. In
the current paper we give new problem-specific certificate with fast verification
and negligible overhead for the Prover.
In exact linear algebra, the simplest problem with an optimal certificate is
the linear system solution, LinSolve: for a matrix A and a vector b, check-
ing that x is actually a solution is done by one multiplication of x by A. The
cost of this check is similar to that of just enumerating all the non-zero co-
efficients of A. Thus certifying a linear system is reduced to multiplying a
matrix by a vector: LinSolve≺MatVecMult. More precisely, by A≺B, we
mean that there exists certificates for A that use certificates for B whose ver-
ification times are essentially similar: Verif(A) = Verif(B)1+o(1). In [9], two
reductions have been made: first, that the rank can be certified via certificates
for linear systems; second, that the characteristic polynomial can be certified
via certificates for the determinant: CharPoly≺Det and Rank≺LinSolve.
The verification procedure for the rank is essentially optimal, it requires two
matrix-vector products and n1+o(1) additional operations; while the verification
of the characteristic polynomial after verification of a determinant is simply
linear. No reduction, however, was given for the determinant. We bridge this
gap in this paper. Indeed, we show here that the computation of the minimal
polynomial can be checked in linear time by a single matrix-vector multiplica-
tion: MinPoly≺MatVecMult. Then we use Wiedemann’s reduction of the
determinant to the minimal polynomial, Det≺MinPoly, [29, 17], and propose
a more efficient preconditioning for the same reduction.
This paper comes with a companion paper [8] that solve similar problems but
with different techniques. We nonetheless believe that they are of independent
interest, as shown by the following comparison of their salient differences: that
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• The paper [8] gives certificates for the Wiedemann sequence, while we here
directly certify its minimal polynomial;
• Complexities for the Verifier time and the extra communications are linear
here while they are increased by (log n)Ω(1) in [8];
• The verification in [8] requires a black box for the transposed matrix;
• The certificates here are interactive while in [8], one of the certificates is, up to
our knowledge, the only known non-interactive protocol for the determinant
with Prover complexity n1.5+o(1).
The paper is organized as follows. We first present in Section 2 a new mul-
tiplicative preconditioner that allows to check the determinant as a quotient of
minors. In Section 3 we define Wiedemann’s projected Krylov sequence and
propose a Monte Carlo certificate for the minimal polynomial of this sequence
in Section 4. We apply this with random projections in Section 5, which pro-
vides a certificate for the minimal polynomial of the matrix. In Section 6, we
see that with a diagonal preconditioning, we obtain another certificate for the
determinant. In Section 7, we then combine this idea with the preconditioner
of Section 2 to obtain a more efficient certificate for the determinant. This can
be combined with the characteristic polynomial reduction of [9], in order to
provide also a linear time certificate for the characteristic polynomial of sparse
or structured matrices.
2 A simple interactive certificate for determi-
nant
We first present a new multiplicative preconditioner that enables the Prover to
compute our simple certificate, which is based on the characteristic matrix of
the companion matrix of the polynomial zn + σ (see (1) below).
Lemma 1.
Let Γ(σ, τ) =

τ −1 0 . . . 0
0 τ −1 . . . ...
... 0
. . .
. . . 0
0
. . . τ −1
σ 0 . . . 0 τ

∈ F[σ, τ ]n×n, (1)
where τ and σ are variables. If A ∈ Fn×n is non-singular, then det(λIn −
A Γ(σ, τ)) is irreducible in F(σ, τ)[λ].
Proof. We observe that for Γ(σ, τ) in (1) we have det(Γ(σ, τ)) = τn+σ, which
is an irreducible polynomial in the bivariate polynomial domain F[σ, τ ]. Next
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we consider the characteristic polynomial of B(σ, τ) = A Γ(σ, τ), namely
cB(σ,τ)(λ) = det(λIn−B(σ, τ)) = λn+cn−1(σ, τ)λn−1+· · ·+c1(σ, τ)λ±
∈F and 6=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
det(A) (τn + σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c0(σ,τ)
.
(2)
We shall argue that the polynomial cB(σ,τ)(λ) in (2) above is irreducible in
F(σ, τ)[λ]. BecauseB(σ, τ) has linear forms in τ and σ as entries, degτ (ci) ≤ n−i
in (2). We now suppose that
g(λ, σ, τ) h(λ, σ, τ) = cB(σ,τ)(λ) (3)
is a non-trivial factorization in F[λ, σ, τ ]. Then one of the degree-0 coefficients in
λ of either g or h, which are g(0, σ, τ) or h(0, σ, τ), is a scalar multiple of τn +σ
because c0(σ, τ) = ±det(A)(τn + σ) 6= 0 (we assumed that A is non-singular)
is irreducible in F[σ, τ ]. Suppose g(0, σ, τ) is a scalar multiple of τn + σ and
consequently h(0, σ, τ) ∈ F. Then degτ (g) = n and therefore degτ (h) = 0, which
means by (3) that h must divide all coefficients of the powers of τ in cB(σ,τ)(λ)
in (2). However, the term τn only occurs in c0(σ, τ) and has coefficient ±det(A)
which is a non-zero field element, and therefore h ∈ F, too. Note that cB(σ,τ)(λ)
has leading coefficient 1 in λ and therefore no non-trivial factor in F[σ, τ ] (one
says it is primitive over F[σ, τ ]). Then, by Gauss’s Lemma, any factorization of
cB(σ,τ)(λ) in F(σ, τ)[λ] can be rewritten as a factorization in F[σ, τ ][λ], and there
is no no-trivial one, so the polynomial must be irreducible also in F(σ, τ)[λ]. 
The Prover must convince the Verifier that ∆ = det(A). Here is the 2 round
interactive protocol. We allow a matrix A with det(A) = 0 in which case the
Prover may not be able to provide the same certificate for the determinant, but,
with high probability, she cannot cheat the Verifier. The Prover can certify
det(A) = 0 by a vector w ∈ Fn with w 6= 0n and Aw = 0n, which the Verifier
can check. The matrix A is public.
The interactive protocol is given in Figure 1. First we show it is com-
plete, namely that if A is non-singular the Prover can choose s, t ∈ F such that
GCD(cB(λ), cC(λ)) = 1, provided F has sufficiently many elements. If A is sin-
gular, the Prover may not be able to do so, in which case she can communicate
that det(A) = 0 and a non-zero vector w ∈ Fn, w 6= 0n, with Aw = 0n.
Let cB(σ,τ)(λ) = det(λIn − A Γ(σ, τ)), where Γ(σ, τ) is in (1), and let
C(σ, τ) = [ (B(σ, τ))i,j ]1≤i,j≤n−1 ∈ F[σ, τ ](n−1)×(n−1). We have the non-zero
Sylvester resultant
ρ(σ, τ) = Resλ(c
B(σ,τ)(λ),det(λIn−1 − C(σ, τ))) 6= 0
because any non-trivial GCD in F(σ, τ)[λ] would have to divide cB(σ,τ)(λ), which
is irreducible by Lemma 1. The Prover chooses t, s such that ρ(t, s) 6= 0, which
for sufficiently large fields is possible by random selection. Note that cB(λ) for
such choices of t, s may no longer be irreducible, but that the resultant of cB
and cC is equal to ρ(t, s) 6= 0 (all polynomials have leading coefficient 1 in λ),
hence GCD(cB , cC) = 1.
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Prover Communication Verifier
1. B = A Γ(t, s)
t, s−−→ Checks tn + s 6= 0,
t, s ∈ F with tn + s 6= 0,
2. cB(λ) = det(λIn −B), c
B−−→
3. C = [bi,j ]1≤i,j≤n−1,
cC(λ) = det(λIn−1 − C), c
C−−→ Checks
t, s ∈ F also with GCD(cB(λ), cC(λ)) = 1
GCD(cB , cC) = 1.
4.
r1←−− r1 ∈ S ⊆ F random
with cB(r1) 6= 0.
5. Computes w such that
(r1In −B)w = en =

0
...
0
1
 w−−→ Checks (r1In −B)w = en,
wn = c
C(r1)/c
B(r1).
6. Returns det(A) =
cB(0)
tn + s
.
Figure 1: A simple sparse determinant protocol
The difficulty in certificates by interaction is the proof of soundness, that
is, that the Verifier detects a dishonest Prover with high probability. Suppose
that the Prover commits H(λ) 6= cB(λ) in place of cB(λ) and/or h(λ) 6= cC(λ)
in place of cC(λ), with deg(H) = n and deg(h) = n − 1 and both H and h
with leading coefficient 1 in λ. The Prover might have chosen t, s such that
GCD(cB(λ), cC(λ)) 6= 1. Or she may have been unable to compute such t, s in
the case when A is singular, and communicated the false H and h instead of
presenting a linear column relation w as a certificate of singularity. In any case,
because h(λ)/H(λ) is a reduced fraction of polynomials with leading coefficient
1 and because cB(λ) and cC(λ) also have leading coefficient 1, we must have
h(λ)/H(λ) 6= cC(λ)/cB(λ), or equivalently h(λ)cB(λ) − H(λ)cC(λ) 6= 0.
The Verifier with probability
≥ 1− deg(c
B(hcB −HcC))
|S| − n ≥ 1−
3n− 2
|S| − n
chooses an r1 such that and c
B(r1) 6= 0 and (hcB − HcC)(r1) 6= 0, both of
which =⇒ cC(r1)/cB(r1) 6= h(r1)/H(r1). The element r1 satisfies H(r1) 6= 0,
hence the −n in the denominator, roots of H are eliminated from selection set
S. Note that deg(hcB−HcC) ≤ 2n−2 because the leading terms λ2n−1 of both
products cancel.
Suppose now that r1 is chosen with those properties. Then
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det(r1In −B) = cB(r1) 6= 0, and by Cramer’s rule
wn =
det(r1In−1 − C)
det(r1In −B) =
cC(r1)
cB(r1)
6= h(r1)
H(r1)
(4)
and the Verifier’s last check fails. Therefore, if the last check also succeeds, with
probability ≥ 1 − (3n − 2)/(|S| − n) we have H = cB and the Verifier has the
correct determinant. Therefore the protocol is sound with high probability.
We do not fully analyze how fast the Prover could compute t, s, cB , cC , and
w, in a modified protocol using additional preconditioners, as we will use the
full Wiedemann technology for sparse and black box matrices in more efficient
protocols below, which we have derived from Figure 1. The Verifier in Fig-
ure 1 checks a polynomial GCD, chooses a random field element, computes a
matrix-times-vector product, and performs some arithmetic, which for a sparse
A constitutes work more or less proportional to the input size. Again, below
we will improve the Verifier complexity, for instance make the GCD verification
O(n). The GCD = 1 property of Step 3 will remain the fundamental ingredient
for the soundness of our protocols.
3 The Wiedemann Sequence
Let A ∈ Fn×n and u, v ∈ Fn. The infinite sequence
(a0, a1, a2, . . . , ai, . . .) with a0 = u
T v, ai = u
TAiv for i ≥ 1, (5)
is due to D. Wiedemann [29]. The sequence is linearly generated by the scalar
minimal generating polynomial fA,uv (λ) ∈ F[λ], which is a factor of the minimal
polynomial of the matrix A, the latter of which we denote by fA(λ). Both
fA and fA,uv are defined as monic polynomials, that is, have leading coefficient
equal to 1.
Theorem 2. Let S ⊆ F be of finite cardinality, which we denote by |S| < ∞,
and let u, v ∈ Sn be uniformly randomly sampled. Then the probability that
fA,uv = f
A is at least (1− deg(fA)/|S|)2 > 1− 2n/|S| (cf. [16, Theorem 5]).
We now define the residue for the linear generator fA,uv .
Definition 3. Let GA,vu (λ) =
∑
i≥0 aiλ
−1−i ∈ F[[λ−1]] be the generating func-
tion of the Wiedemann sequence (5). Then we define the residue ρA,vu (λ) =
fA,vu (λ)G
A,v
u (λ) ∈ F[λ].
Lemma 4. The residue ρA,vu in Definition 3 satisfies:
GCD(ρA,vu (λ), f
A,v
u (λ)) = 1
Proof. The field of quotients of the ring of power series in λ−1 is denoted
by F((λ−1)), the ring of extended power series in λ−1, whose elements can
be represented as
∑
i≤k ciλ
i for ci ∈ F and k ∈ Z. The residue ρA,vu (λ) is
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computed in F((λ−1)), but because fA,vu (λ) is a linear generator for (ai)i≥0,
ρA,vu (λ) is a polynomial in F[λ] with deg(ρA,vu ) < deg(fA,vu ). If the greatest
common divisor g(λ) = GCD(ρA,vu (λ), f
A,v
u (λ)) is not trivial, then the equa-
tion ρA,vu /g = (f
A,v
u /g)G
A,v
u yields f
A,v
u /g as a linear generator for (ai)i≥0 of
lower degree than the degree of fA,vu , which violates the minimality of the linear
generator fA,vu .
4 A Certificate for the linear
generator
We give the 2-rounds interactive protocol in Figure 2. The Prover must convince
the Verifier that fA,vu is indeed the Wiedemann generator for (u
TAiv)i≥0. The
matrix A and vectors u, v are public.
Prover Communication Verifier
1. H(λ) = fA,vu (λ),
h(λ) = ρA,vu (λ).
H,h−−→
2. φ, ψ ∈ F[λ] with
φfA,vu + ψρ
A,v
u = 1,
φ, ψ−−→
deg(φ) ≤ deg(ρA,vu )− 1,
deg(ψ) ≤ deg(fA,vu )− 1.
3. Random r0 ∈ S ⊆ F. Checks
GCD(H(λ), h(λ)) = 1 by
φ(r0)H(r0) + ψ(r0)h(r0)
?
== 1.
r1←−− Random r1 ∈ S ⊆ F.
4. Computes w such that
(r1In −A)w = v. w−−→ Checks (r1In −A)w ?== v
and (uTw)H(r1)
?
== h(r1).
Returns fA,vu (λ) = H(λ).
Figure 2: Certificate for fA,vu
In Step 4 Peggy may not be able to produce a vector w when r1In − A is
singular. However, she may instead convince Victor that the random choice
of r1 has led to a “failure”. We investigate the case where the linear system
is inconsistent more precisely. Let fA,v(λ) denote the minimal linear gener-
ator of the Krylov sequences of vectors (Aiv)i≥0. We have that the minimal
polynomial fA of A is a multiple of fA,v. Suppose now that fA,v(r1) = 0
and let λ2, . . . , λm be the remaining roots of f
A,v in the algebraic closure of
F. We obtain from fA,v(A)v = 0n that 0n = (
∏m
j=2(A − λjIn))(A − r1In)w =
(
∏m
j=2(A − λjIn))(−v), in violation that fA,v(A)v constitutes the first linear
dependence of the Krylov vectors (Aiv)i≥0. Conversely, if fA,v(r1) 6= 0 then
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the system (r1I −A)w = v is consistent with w = (1/fA,v(r1)) ~ρA,v(r1) (see (6)
multiplied by λIn − A in the soundness proof below). We just proved that the
linear system (r1In−A) is inconsistent with v if and only if fA,v(r1) = 0 (hence
in particular r1In − A is singular). Peggy could provide a non-zero vector in
the right nullspace of r1In −A as a proof that Victor has communicated a bad
r1. Since one can have f
A,v
u (r1) 6= 0 when fA,v(r1) = 0 Victor cannot test the
choice of r1 before sending it even if the communicated f
A,v
u is correct.
Given the above, the protocol is perfectly complete: if the values (fA,vu , ρ
A,v
u )
and the system solution w = (1/fA,v(r1)) ~ρ
A,v(r1) communicated by the Prover
are correct, the Verifier always accepts fA,vu . In case that the system (r1In −
A)w = v is inconsistent, the Prover could communicate a Farkas certificate of
inconsistency w¯ with w¯T (r1In−A) = 0 and w¯T v 6= 0. When a Farkas certificate
of inconsistency is sent, the Verifier then accepts the “correct” output that the
choice of r1 has led to “failure.”
In Figure 2 we allow inconsistent systems to remain uncertified for two rea-
sons: 1. A Farkas certificate requires additional work for the Prover, possibly
needing a transposed matrix times vector procedure for a black box matrix A.
2. Monte Carlo algorithms are always fast and do not fail. Their output is
correct with probability ≥ a given bound. Our certificates indeed have Monte
Carlo randomized verification algorithms, that is, as we will prove below, the
interactive protocol does not fail via system inconsistency in Step 4 and, when
all checks succeed, the first pair of polynomials communicated is fA,vu and ρ
A,v
u
with probability ≥ (1− (2n− 2)/|S|)(1− (3n− 1)/|S|).
Proof of soundness: Now suppose that the Prover commits H(λ) in place of
fA,vu (λ) and/or h(λ) in place of ρ
A,v
u (λ), with n ≥ deg(H) > deg(h) and h/H 6=
ρA,vu /f
A,v
u . The Verifier with probability
≥ 1− (deg(φH + ψh)) /|S|
≥ 1− (max{deg(H) + deg(φ),deg(h) + deg(ψ)}) /|S|
≥ 1− (2n− 2) /|S|
exposes that (φH+ψh)(r0) 6= 1. Suppose now that the Verifier’s check succeeds
and that actually GCD(H,h) = 1. The Verifier with probability
≥ 1− (deg(fA(HρA,vu − hfA,vu ))) /|S|
≥ 1− (3n− 1) /|S|
chooses an r1 such that f
A(r1) 6= 0 (that is, r1In − A is non-singular) and
(HρA,vu −hfA,vu )(r1) 6= 0. The latter rewrites as h(r1) 6= H(r1)ρA,vu (r1)/fA,vu (r1).
Note that fA(r1) 6= 0⇒ fA,vu (r1) 6= 0. Suppose now that r1 is chosen with those
properties. As in the proof of Lemma 4 we can define
GA,v(λ) =
∑
i≥0
λ−(i+1)(Aiv) ∈ Fn[[λ−1]],
~ρA,v(λ) = fA,v(λ)GA,v(λ) ∈ Fn[λ].
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We have (λIn −A)GA,v(λ) = v and
(λIn −A)−1v = 1
fA,v(λ)
~ρA,v(λ). (6)
Furthermore, (uT ~ρA,v)/fA,v = ρA,vu /f
A,v
u , where the left-hand side is not nec-
essarily a reduced fraction. Thus, uTwH(r1) = u
T (r1In − A)−1v H(r1) =
(ρA,vu /f
A,v
u )(r1) ·H(r1) 6= h(r1), and the Verifier’s last check fails; one can com-
pare with (4), which has u = v = en and f
B,v
u = c
B . Therefore, if the last check
also succeeds, with probability ≥ (1 − (2n − 2)/|S|)(1 − (3n − 1)/|S|) we have
GCD(H,h) = 1 and h/H = ρA,vu /f
A,v
u .
About the certificate complexity: Excluding the input matrix A and the output
minimal polynomial fA,vu , the certificate in Figure 2 comprises ρ
A,v
u , monic of
degree strictly less than n; then φ, ψ, of degree respectively less than n−2 and n−
1; and finally w, a vector of Fn. The extra communications for the certificate are
thus less than 4n field elements. For the time complexity, evaluating φ, f, ψ, ρ, f
and ρ requires less than 6(2n) field operations, Aw is one matrix-vector, of cost
µ(A), and checking (r1In−A)w (either for a solution, or as a non-zero vector in
the right nullspace) requires an additional 2n operations, like uTw. The multi-
plication of the vector by fA,vu (r1) requires finally n more multiplications in the
field. We have thus proven Theorem 5 thereafter.
Theorem 5. If the size of the field is ≥ 3n, the protocol in Figure 2 is sound
and complete. The associated certificate requires less than 4n extra field elements
and is verifiable in less than µ(A) + 17n field operations.
Note that, with slightly larger fields, one can further reduce the complexity
for the Verifier.
Corollary 6. If the size of the field is ≥ 5n− 2, there exists a sound and per-
fectly complete protocol for certifying fA,vu , whose associated certificate requires
less than 4n extra field elements and is verifiable in less than µ(A) + 13n field
operations.
Proof. For the complexity improvement, it suffices to chose r0 = r1. Then the
last evaluations of fA,vu (r1) and ρ
A,v
u (r1) are already computed by the GCD
check. Now r0 must be such that f
A(HρA,vu − hfA,vu )(φH + ψh − 1) (r0) 6= 0,
but the latter is of degree deg(fA) + max{deg(H) + deg(φ),deg(h) + deg(ψ)}+
max{deg(H) + deg(ρA,vu ),deg(h) + deg(fA,vu )} ≤ 3n− 1 + 2n− 2. Furthermore,
the analysis in the beginning of this section shows that the protocol of Figure 2
can be extended to be perfectly complete.
Remark 7 (Certificate over small fields). For the certificates of this paper
to be sound, the underlying field cannot be too small: Ω(n) for the minimal
polynomial certificates, Ω(n2) for the following determinant or characteristic
polynomial certificates. If the field is smaller, then a classical technique is
to embed it in an extension of adequate size. Arithmetic operations in this
extension field L ⊃ F of degree O(log n) will then cost log(n)1+o(1) operations
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in the base field, but with s ≥ log2(1/) matrix A times vectors ∈ Fn operations,
that is over the base field, an incorrect w is exposed with probability≥ 1−1/2s ≥
1−  for any constant  > 0.
We give the idea for F = Z2 and L = Z2[θ]/(χ(θ)) where χ is an irreducible
polynomial in Z2[θ] with deg(χ) = k + 1 = O(log n). The Prover returns w =
w[0]+θw[1]+···+θkw[k] with w[κ] ∈ Zn2 . For v[0]+θv[1]+···+θkv[k] = v−r1w with
v[κ] ∈ Zn2 we must have −Aw[κ] = v[κ] for all κ. Suppose that the Prover has sent
a w that violates j of the equations, namely, −Aw[`i] = y[`i] 6= v[`i] for 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
Then |{(c1, . . . , cj) ∈ Zj2 |
∑j
i=1 ciy
[`i] 6= ∑ji=1 civ[`i]}| ≥ 2j−1. The inequality is
immediate for j = 1, 2. For j ≥ 3 one gets for each ∑j−2i=1 ciy[`i] = ∑j−2i=1 civ[`i]
the two unequal linear combinations for cj−1 = 1, cj = 0 and cj−1 = 0, cj = 1;
one also gets for each
∑j−2
i=1 ciy
[`i] 6= ∑j−2i=1 civ[`i] the unequal linear combination
for cj−1 = cj = 0; a second unequal combination is either for cj−1 = 1, cj = 0
or cj−1 = cj = 1, because not both can be equal at the same time. Therefore
|{(c0, . . . , ck) ∈ Zk+12 | −A(
∑k
i=0 ciw
[i]) 6= (∑ki=0 civ[i]) }| ≥ 2k which shows
that checking a random linear combination over Z2 exposes an incorrect w with
probability ≥ 1/2. The cost for the Verifier is thus O(µ(A))+n1+o(1) operations
in Z2.
Complexity for the Prover: Theorem 5 places no requirement on how the Prover
computes the required commitments. Coppersmith’s block Wiedemann method [5],
for instance, can be used.
Theorem 8. If the size of the field is > 3n then the Prover can produce the
certificate in Figure 2 in no more than (1 + o(1))n multiplications of A times
a vector in Fn and n2+o(1) additional operations in F, using n1+o(1) auxiliary
storage for elements in F.
Proof. The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm can be applied on the sequence (ai)i≥0 =
(uTAiv)i≥0 to recover fA,vu . However that requires (at most) 2n terms to be
computed [29], and hence more multiplications of A times a vector than re-
quested in the statement. Following [16, Sec. 7], the number of applications of
A can be minimized using Coppersmith’s block Wiedemann algorithm [5] with a
special choice of parameters. We consider integers p and q (the blocking factors)
such that q = o(p), p = no(1), and 1/q = o(1). For example, we may choose
p = (log n)2 and q = log n.
For the block Wiedemann algorithm we first take random U0 ∈ Fn×(p−1) and
V0 ∈ Fn×(q−1) with entries sampled from S ⊆ F, and construct U = [u,U0] ∈
Fn×p and V = [v,V0] ∈ Fn×q. With dl = dn/(p− 1)e and dr = dn/(q − 1)e, the
rank of the block Hankel matrix Hkdl,dr (A,U0,V0) in [18, (2.4)] is maximal with
high probability, and equal to the dimension of the Krylov space KA,V0 (using
q ≤ p). Since the degree of the q-th (resp. the p-th) highest degree invariant
factor of λ − A has degree less than dr (resp. dl), less than dr (resp. dl) first
Krylov iterates (Aiv)i≥0 (resp. (uTAi)i≥0) suffice for completing any basis of
KA,V0 into a basis of KA,V . (resp. KA,U0 and KA,U ). Therefore the rank of
Hkdl,dr (A,U ,V) must be maximal and equal to dimKA,V .
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The determinant of a submatrix of Hkdl,dr (A,U ,V) with maximal rank has
degree at most 2n in the entries of U0 and V0. Using arguments analogous to
those in [27, sec. 9.2] or [18, Sec. 3.2], by the DeMillo-Lipton/Schwartz/Zippel
Lemma [7, 30, 25], we obtain that:
Prob (rank Hkdl,dr (A,U ,V) = dimKA,V) ≥ 1− 2n/|S|. (7)
If S contains sufficiently many elements, it follows [27, 18] that it is sufficient to
compute the sequence of p× q matrices Ai = UTAiV up to L = dl + dr terms,
which can be achieved with qL = n(1+o(1)) multiplications of A times a vector,
and n2+o(1) additional operations in F. Let
GA,VU (λ) =
∑
i≥0
Aiλ−1−i =
∑
i≥0
UTAiVλ−1−i ∈ Fp×q[[λ−1]]
be the generating function for the block Wiedemann sequence. One can then
compute a rational fraction description of GA,VU , in the form of a pair of matrices
F(λ) ∈ Fq×q[λ] and R(λ) ∈ Fp×q[λ] with degree dr = o(n), so that F is a
minimal matrix generator for (Ai)i≥0, and
GA,VU (λ)F(λ) = R(λ) ∈ Fp×q[λ].
The matrices F and R can be computed in time soft-linear in n [1], and since
the dimensions are in no(1), the matrix fraction R(λ)F(λ)−1 is also obtained
in soft-linear time. Any of the entries of this matrix fraction is a rational
fraction description of a sequence corresponding to two chosen vectors among
the blocking vectors. In particular, from the entry (1,1), Peggy obtains the
rational fraction description ρA,vu /f
A,v
u of (ai)i≥0. The computation of φ and ψ
follows via an extended Euclidean algorithm applied on fA,vu and ρ
A,v
u .
A small variation of the above scheme solves the inhomogenous linear system
in Step 4. Let B = r1In − A. With high probability, Victor chooses a r1 such
that fA(r1) 6= 0, hence B is non-singular. Together with (7) this gives the
requirement 3n+ 1 for the field size.
We have that F ′ = F(r1−λ) is a minimal matrix generator for the sequence
of p × q matrices (UTBiV)i≥0 (computing F ′ is a soft-linear operation). Since
B is non-singular we have detF ′(0) 6= 0. With column operations on F ′, we
can arrange so that one column becomes [f0, 0, . . . , 0]
T with f0 6= 0. V times
the latter being f0.v, following the inhomogeneous case in [5, Sec. 8], this suf-
fices to solve the linear system Bw = v, using dr = o(n) more matrix-vector
multiplications and n2+o(1) operations in F.
5 A Certificate for the minimal polynomial
With random vectors u and v, we address the certification of the minimal poly-
nomial fA. Indeed, using Wiedemann’s study [29, Sec. VI] or the alternative
approach in [17, 16], we know that for random u and v, fA,vu is equal to f
A with
high probability (see Theorem 2). This is shown in Figure 3.
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Prover Communication Verifier
1.
u, v←−−−−−−−− Random u, v ∈ Sn ⊆ Fn.
Figure 2
2.
H,h, φ, ψ−−−−−−−−→
3.
r1←−−−−−−−−
4. w−−−−−−−−→ Checks H ?== fA,vu , w.h.p.
5. Returns fA = fA,vu , w.h.p.
Figure 3: Certificate for fA with random projections
Proposition 9. The protocol in Figure 3 is sound and complete.
Proof. First, the protocol is complete. Indeed, the result is correct means
that H = fA. Thus, if fA = fA,vu , then completeness is guaranteed by the
completeness in Theorem 5. Otherwise, H is a proper multiple of fA,vu and
H = fA 6= fA,vu . If u, v are randomly chosen by Victor, this happens only with
low probability, thanks to Theorem 2.
Second, for the soundness, if the result is incorrect, then H 6= fA. If also
H 6= fA,vu , then similarly, H will make the certificate of Figure 2 fail with high
probability, by the soundness in Theorem 5. Otherwise, H = fA,vu 6= fA, but
if u, v are randomly chosen by Victor, this happens only with low probability,
thanks to Theorem 2.
Corollary 10. If the size of the field is ≥ 5n − 2, there exists a sound and
perfectly complete protocol for certifying fA, whose associated certificate requires
less than 8n extra field elements and is verifiable in less than 2µ(A) + 26n field
operations.
Proof. We add some work for the Prover, and double the certificate. First Peggy
has to detect that the projections given by Victor reveal only a proper factor
of the minimal polynomial. Second she needs to prove to Victor that he was
wrong. For this, Peggy:
• Computes the minimal polynomial fA of the matrix and the minimal poly-
nomial fA,vu .
• If fA 6= fA,vu , Peggy searches for projections (uˆ, vˆ), such that deg(fA,vˆuˆ ) >
deg(fA,vu ).
• Peggy then starts two certificates of Figure 2, one for (u, v), one for (uˆ, vˆ).
In case of success of the latter two certificates, Victor is convinced that both
fA,vu and f
A,vˆ
uˆ are correct. But as the latter polynomial has a degree strictly
larger than the former, he is also convinced that his projections can not reveal
fA. Complexities are given by applying Corollary 6 twice.
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Remark 11 (Certificate for the rank). If A is non-singular, the certificate
of [9, Figure 2] can be used to certify non-singularity: for any random vector
b proposed by Victor, Peggy can solve the system Aw = b and return w as a
certificate. Now, if A is singular, a similar idea as for the minimal polynomial
can be used to certify the rank: precondition the matrix A into a modified
matrix B whose minimal polynomial is f(x)x and characteristic polynomial is
f(x)xk, where f(0) 6= 0. As a consequence rank(A) = n − k. For instance, if
A is symmetric, such a PreCondCycNil preconditioner can be a non-singular
diagonal matrix D if the field is sufficiently large [3, Theorem 4.3]. Otherwise,
ATD2A is symmetric, with D2 another diagonal matrix. Then the minimal
polynomial certificate can be applied to B = DATD2AD [10]. Comparing
with the certificate for the rank in [9, Corollary 3], this new certificate saves
a logarithmic factor in the verification time, but requires the field to be larger
(from Ω(n) to Ω(n2)).
6 Certificate for the determinant with Diagonal
preconditioning
First of all, if A is singular, Peggy may not be able to produce the desired
certificate. In which case she can communicate that det(A) = 0 and produce a
non-zero vector in the kernel: w ∈ Fn, w 6= 0n, with Aw = 0n.
We thus suppose in the following that A is non-singular.
The idea of [29, Theorem 2] is to precondition the initial invertible matrix
A into a modified matrix B whose characteristic polynomial is square-free, and
whose determinant is an easily computable modification of that of A. For in-
stance, such a PreCondCyc preconditioner can be a non-singular diagonal
matrix D if the field is sufficiently large [3, Theorem 4.2]:
Prob
(
deg
(
fDA
)
= n
) ≥ 1− n(n− 1)
2|S| (8)
To certify the determinant, it is thus sufficient for Peggy to chose a non-singular
diagonal matrix D and two vectors u, v such that deg(fDA,vu ) = n and then to
use the minimal polynomial certificate for fDA,vu , as shown on Figure 4.
Remark 12. Note that in the minimal polynomial sub-routine of Figure 4,
Peggy can actually choose D,u, v, since the check on the degree of fB,vu prevents
bad choices for D,u, v. Victor could also select them himself, the overall volume
of communications would be unchanged, but he would have to perform more
work, namely selecting 3n+ 2 random elements instead of just 1.
Theorem 13. If the size of the field is ≥ max{ 12n2− 12n, 5n−2}, the protocol for
the determinant of a non-singular matrix in Figure 4 is sound and complete. The
associated certificate requires less than 8n extra field elements and is verifiable
in less than µ(A) + 15n field operations. If the size of the field is ≥ n2 + n+ 5,
with high probability the Prover can produce it with no more than 2 minimal
polynomial computations, and 1 system solving.
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Prover Communication Verifier
1. Form B = DA with
D ∈ Sn ⊆ F∗n D,u, v−−−−−−−−→
and u, v ∈ Sn,
s.t. deg(fB,vu ) = n.
Figure 2
2.
H,h, φ, ψ−−−−−−−−→ Checks:
3.
r1←−−−−−−−− deg(H) ?== n,
4. w−−−−−−−−→ H ?== fB,vu , w.h.p.
5. Returns
fB,vu (0)
det(D)
.
Figure 4: Determinant certificate with Diagonal preconditioning for a non-
singular matrix
Proof. First, if the Prover is honest, H is correctly checked to be fB,vu , as the
minimal polynomial is complete. Then, by definition, fB,vu is a factor of the
characteristic polynomial of B. But if its degree is n, then it is the character-
istic polynomial. Therefore its unit coefficient is the determinant of B and the
certificate of Figure 4 is complete.
Second, for the soundness. If H 6= fB,vu , then the minimal polynomial cer-
tificate will most probably fail, by the soundness of the minimal polynomial
certificate, as |S| ≥ (5n − 2), from Corollary 6. Otherwise, the degree check
enforces that fB,vu is the characteristic polynomial.
Now, for the complexity, with respect to the minimal polynomial certifi-
cate and Theorem 5, this certificate requires an extra diagonal matrix D. As
u, v, fB,vu are not input/output anymore, the extra communications grow from
4n field elements to 8n. The verification procedure is similar except that ver-
ifying a linear system solution with B requires n + µ(A) operations and that
det(D) has to be computed, hence the supplementary 2n field operations. Fi-
nally, for the Prover, in order to find suitable vectors and diagonal matrices,
Peggy can select them randomly in Sn and try fDA,vu until deg(f
DA,v
u ) = n. It
will succeed with the joint probabilities of Theorem 2 and Equation (8). For
n ≥ 2, as soon as |S| ≥ n2 +n+ 5, the lower bound of the probability of success
(1 − n(n− 1)/(2|S|))(1 − 2n/|S|) is higher than 1/2 and the expected number
of trials for the Prover is less than 2.
Note that the certificate (as well as that of next section) can be made per-
fectly complete, by using the perfectly complete certificate for the minimal poly-
nomial of Corollary 10.
15
7 Determinant with Gamma
preconditioning
In order to compute the determinant via a minimal polynomial, the diagonal
preconditioning ensures that it is equal to the characteristic polynomial, as
the latter is square-free with factors of degree 1. With the preconditioning
of Section 2, we can differently ensure that the characteristic polynomial is
irreducible. It has the same effect, that it equals the minimal polynomial, but it
also enforces that it has no smaller degree factors. Therefore, for any non-zero
u and v, as a non-singular matrix is non-zero, the only possibility for fA,vu is to
be of degree n. Thus, we can give in Figure 5 an improved certificate. It chooses
pre-determined vectors u and v to be as simple as possible: the canonical vector
e1 = [1, 0, . . . , 0]
T .
Prover Communication Verifier
1. Form B = A Γ(s, t)
with s, t ∈ F s.t. s, t−−−−−−−−→ Checks tn + s 6= 0.
Γ(s, t) non-singular
(⇔ tn + s 6= 0)
and Hn(s, t) 6= 0.
(see (1) and (9))
Figure 2
2.
H,h, φ, ψ−−−−−−−−→ Checks:
3.
r1←−−−−−−−− deg(H) ?== n,
4. w−−−−−−−−→ H ?== fB,e1e1 , w.h.p.
5. Returns
fB,e1e1 (0)
tn + s
.
Figure 5: Determinant certificate with Gamma preconditioning for a non-
singular matrix
Theorem 14. If the size of the field is ≥ max{n2−n, 5n−2}, the protocol for the
determinant of a non-singular matrix in Figure 5 is sound and complete. The
associated certificate requires less than 5n extra field elements and is verifiable in
less than µ(A)+13n+o(n) field operations. If the size of the field is ≥ 2n2−2n,
with high probability the Prover can produce it with no more than 2 minimal
polynomial computations, and 1 system solving.
Proof. Completeness is given by the same argument as for Theorem 13. It is
similar for the soundness, provided that Hn(s, t) 6= 0 implies that deg(fB,e1e1 ) =
n.
Therefore, let CB(σ,τ)(λ) = det(λIn − A Γ(σ, τ)), where Γ(σ, τ) is in (1).
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Then, for e1 = [1, 0, . . . , 0]
T the first canonical vector, let G
B(σ,τ)
1 (λ) = e
T
1 (λIn−
A)−1e1, and let ρ
(σ,τ)
1 (λ) = C
B(σ,τ)(λ)G
B(σ,τ)
1 (λ).
As CB(σ,τ) is monic and eT1 e1 = 1, then G
B(σ,τ)
1 and ρ
(σ,τ)
1 are not identically
zero. Further, CB(σ,τ) is irreducible by Lemma 1 but the minimal polynomial for
the projected sequence must divide CB . Therefore the sequence has CB for min-
imal polynomial. Now, this sequence is denoted by (si(σ, τ)) = (e
T
1 B(σ, τ)
ie1),
and let Hn(σ, τ) ∈ F(σ, τ)n×n:
Hn(σ, τ) =

s0(σ, τ) s1(σ, τ) . . . sn−1(σ, τ)
s1(σ, τ) s2(σ, τ) . . . sn(σ, τ)
...
. . .
...
sn−1(σ, τ) sn(σ, τ) . . . s2n−2(σ, τ)
 . (9)
Since the minimal polynomial of the sequence is of degree n, Hn(σ, τ) is
non-singular [18, Eq. (2.6)]. Thus, any s, t with det(Hn(s, t)) 6= 0 will yield
f
B(s,t),e1
e1 = C
B(s,t). Now for the complexities:
• The volume of communication is reduced, from 8n to 5n.
• With respect to Theorem 13, the cost for Victor is slightly improved: an
application by D replaced by an application by Γ(s, t), a dot-product with u
replaced by one with e1, and n operations for det(D) are replaced by less than
2dlog2(n)e+ 1 to compute tn + s. The overall verification cost thus decreases
from µ(A) + 15n+ o(n) to µ(A) + 13n+ o(n);
• For Peggy, applying the diagonal scaling costs n per iteration, while ap-
plying Γ(s, t) costs 2n operations per iteration; but applying a random uT
costs about 2n operations per iteration, while applying eT1 is just select-
ing the first coefficient, so her cost is slightly improved. Then, too choose
such s, t, Peggy can try uniformly sampled elements in S, and see whether
deg(f
B(s,t),e1
e1 ) = n. Since deg(Γ(σ, τ)) = 1, we have that deg(si(σ, τ)) ≤ i and
deg(det(Hn(σ, τ))) ≤ n(n−1). Hence, by the DeMillo-Lipton/Schwartz/Zippel
Lemma
Prob (det(Hn(s, t)) 6= 0) ≥ 1− n(n− 1)|S| . (10)
As soon as |S| ≥ 2n(n− 1), the probability of success for Peggy is thus larger
than 1/2 and the expected number of trials is less than 2.
We gather the differences between the protocols of Figure 4 and 5 in Table 1.
The two certificate differ mostly only in the preconditioning. But this allows
to gain a lot of randomization: the number of random field elements per try to
sample for Peggy is reduced from 3n to only 2. As the size of the set is Ω(n2),
this reduces the number of random bits from O(n log(n)) to O(log(n)).
Remark 15 (Certificate for the characteristic polynomial). The certificate for
the determinant can be combined with the characteristic polynomial reduction
of [9, Figure 1]. As this reduction is linear for Victor, this then provides now
also a linear time verification procedure for the characteristic polynomial:
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Certificates for the determinant of sparse matrices
Preconditioner § 6 : D § 7 : Γ(t, s)
Verifier µ(A) + 15n+ o(n) µ(A) + 13n+ o(n)
Communications 8n 5n
Random elements 3n+ 2 3
Prover MinPoly(n) + LinSys(n)
Field size ≥ 12 (n2 − n) ≥ n2 − n
Table 1: Summary of the complexity bounds of the certificates presented in this
paper for the determinant of sparse matrices (n is the dimension, µ(A) bounds
the cost of one matrix-vector product, MinPoly(n) (resp. LinSys(n)) is the
cost of computing the minimal polynomial of a sequence (resp. of solving a
linear system).
1. Peggy sends cA as the characteristic polynomial;
2. Victor now sends back a random point r ∈ S ⊆ F;
3. Peggy and Victor enter a determinant certificate for rI −A;
4. Once convinced, Victor checks that det(rI −A) ?== cA(r).
For a random r ∈ S, in the determinant sub-certificate, rI − A will be non-
singular if cA(r) 6= 0, hence with probability ≥ 1− n/|S|. Then det(rI − A) is
certified using the certificate of Figure 5.
Best known algorithms for computing the characteristic polynomial, using
either quadratic space and fast matrix multiplication or linear space [28], have
cost O(n2+α) for some α > 0. The characteristic polynomial with µ(A) = O(n)
is thus an example of a problem whose worst-case complexity bound is super-
quadratic in the verification cost O(n).
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